A great article from http://www.gusmorino.com/pag3/greatdepression/ The Great Depression was the worst economic slump ever in U.S. history, and one which spread to virtually all of the industrialized world. The depression began in late 1929 and lasted for about a decade. Many factors played a role in bringing about the depression; however, the main cause for the Great Depression was the combination of the greatly unequal distribution of wealth throughout the 1920's, and the extensive stock market speculation that took place during the latter part that same decade. The maldistribution of wealth in the 1920's existed on many levels. Money was distributed disparately between the rich and the middle-class, between industry and agriculture within the United States, and between the U.S. and Europe. This imbalance of wealth created an unstable economy. The excessive speculation in the late 1920's kept the stock market artificially high, but eventually lead to large market crashes. These market crashes, combined with the maldistribution of wealth, caused the American economy to capsize. The "roaring twenties" was an era when our country prospered tremendously. The nation's total realized income rose from $74.3 billion in 1923 to $89 billion in 19291. However, the rewards of the "Coolidge Prosperity" of the 1920's were not shared evenly among all Americans. According to a study done by the Brookings Institute, in 1929 the top 0.1% of Americans had a combined income equal to the bottom 42%2. That same top 0.1% of Americans in 1929 controlled 34% of all savings, while 80% of Americans had no savings at all3. Automotive industry mogul Henry Ford provides a striking example of the unequal distribution of wealth between the rich and the middle-class. Henry Ford reported a personal income of $14 million4 in the same year that the average personal income was $7505. By present day standards, where the average yearly income in the U.S. is around $18,5006, Mr. Ford would be earning over $345 million a year! This maldistribution of income between the rich and the middle class grew throughout the 1920's. While the disposable income per capita rose 9% from 1920 to 1929, those with income within the top 1% enjoyed a stupendous 75% increase in per capita disposable income7. A major reason for this large and growing gap between the rich and the working-class people was the increased manufacturing output throughout this period. From 1923-1929 the average output per worker increased 32% in manufacturing8. During that same period of time average wages for manufacturing jobs increased only 8%9. Thus wages increased at a rate one fourth as fast as productivity increased. As production costs fell quickly, wages rose slowly, and prices remained constant, the bulk benefit of the increased productivity went into corporate profits. In fact, from 1923-1929 corporate profits rose 62% and dividends rose 65%10. The federal government also contributed to the growing gap between the rich and middle-class. Calvin Coolidge's administration (and the conservative-controlled government) favored business, and as a result the wealthy who invested in these businesses. An example of legislation to this purpose is the Revenue Act of 1926, signed by President Coolidge on February 26, 1926, which reduced federal income and inheritance taxes dramatically11. Andrew Mellon, Coolidge's Secretary of the Treasury, was the main force behind these and other tax cuts throughout the 1920's. In effect, he was able to lower federal taxes such that a man with a million-dollar annual income had his federal taxes reduced from $600,000 to $200,00012. Even the Supreme Court played a role in expanding the gap between the socioeconomic classes. In the 1923 case Adkins v. Children's Hospital, the Supreme Court ruled minimum-wage legislation unconstitutional13. The large and growing disparity of wealth between the well-to-do and the middle-income citizens made the U.S. economy unstable. For an economy to function properly, total demand must equal total supply. In an economy with such disparate distribution of income it is not assured that demand will always equal supply. Essentially what happened in the 1920's was that there was an oversupply of goods. It was not that the surplus products of industrialized society were not wanted, but rather that those whose needs were not satiated could not afford more, whereas the wealthy were satiated by spending only a small portion of their income. A 1932 article in Current History articulates the problems of this maldistribution of wealth: We still pray to be given each day our daily bread. Yet there is too much bread, too much wheat and corn, meat and oil and almost every other commodity required by man for his subsistence and material happiness. We are not able to purchase the abundance that modern methods of agriculture, mining and manufacturing make available in such bountiful quantities14. Three quarters of the U.S. population would spend essentially all of their yearly incomes to purchase consumer goods such as food, clothes, radios, and cars. These were the poor and middle class: families with incomes around, or usually less than, $2,500 a year. The bottom three quarters of the population had an aggregate income of less than 45% of the combined national income; the top 25% of the population took in more than 55% of the national income15. While the wealthy too purchased consumer goods, a family earning $100,000 could not be expected to eat 40 times more than a family that only earned $2,500 a year, or buy 40 cars, 40 radios, or 40 houses. Through such a period of imbalance, the U.S. came to rely upon two things in order for the economy to remain on an even keel: credit sales, and luxury spending and investment from the rich. One obvious solution to the problem of the vast majority of the population not having enough money to satisfy all their needs was to let those who wanted goods buy products on credit. The concept of buying now and paying later caught on quickly. By the end of the 1920's 60% of cars and 80% of radios were bought on installment credit16. Between 1925 and 1929 the total amount of outstanding installment credit more than doubled from $1.38 billion to around $3 billion17. Installment credit allowed one to "telescope the future into the present", as the President's Committee on Social Trends noted18. This strategy created artificial demand for products which people could not ordinarily afford. It put off the day of reckoning, but it made the downfall worse when it came. By telescoping the future into the present, when "the future" arrived, there was little to buy that hadn't already been bought. In addition, people could not longer use their regular wages to purchase whatever items they didn't have yet, because so much of the wages went to paying back past purchases. The U.S. economy was also reliant upon luxury spending and investment from the rich to stay afloat during the 1920's. The significant problem with this reliance was that luxury spending and investment were based on the wealthy's confidence in the U.S. economy. If conditions were to take a downturn (as they did with the market crashed in fall and winter 1929), this spending and investment would slow to a halt. While savings and investment are important for an economy to stay balanced, at excessive levels they are not good. Greater investment usually means greater productivity. However, since the rewards of the increased productivity were not being distributed equally, the problems of income distribution (and of overproduction) were only made worse. Lastly, the search for ever greater returns on investment lead to wide-spread market speculation. Maldistribution of wealth within our nation was not limited to only socioeconomic classes, but to entire industries. In 1929 a mere 200 corporations controlled approximately half of all corporate wealth19. While the automotive industry was thriving in the 1920's, some industries, agriculture in particular, were declining steadily. In 1921, the same year that Ford Motor Company reported record assets of more than $345 million, farm prices plummeted, and the price of food fell nearly 72% due to a huge surplus20. While the average per capita income in 1929 was $750 a year for all Americans, the average annual income for someone working in agriculture was only $27321. The prosperity of the 1920's was simply not shared among industries evenly. In fact, most of the industries that were prospering in the 1920's were in some way linked to the automotive industry or to the radio industry. The automotive industry was the driving force behind many other booming industries in the 1920's. By 1928, with over 21 million cars on the roads, there was roughly one car for every six Americans22. The first industries to prosper were those that made materials for cars. The booming steel industry sold roughly 15% of its products to the automobile industry23. The nickel, lead, and other metal industries capitalized similarly. The new closed cars of the 1920's benefited the glass, leather, and textile industries greatly. And manufacturers of the rubber tires that these cars used grew even faster than the automobile industry itself, for each car would probably need more than one set of tires over the course of its life. The fuel industry also profited and expanded. Companies such as Ethyl Corporation made millions with items such as new "knock-free" fuel additives for cars24. In addition, "tourist homes" (hotels and motels) opened up everywhere. With such a wealthy upper-class many luxury hotels were needed. In 1924 alone, hotels such as the Mayflower (Washington D.C.), the Parker House (Boston), The Palmer House (Chicago), and the Peabody (Memphis) opened their doors25. Lastly, and possibly most importantly, the construction industry benefited tremendously from the automobile. With the growing number of cars, there was a big demand for paved roads. During the 1920's Americans spent more than a $1 billion each year on the construction and maintenance of highways, and at least another $400 million annually for city streets26. But the automotive industry affected construction far more than that. The automobile had been central to the urbanization of the country in the 1920's because so many other industries relied upon it. With urbanization came the need to build many more apartment buildings, factories, offices, and stores. From 1919 to 1928 the construction industry grew by around $5 billion dollars, nearly 50%27. Also prospering during the 1920's were businesses dependent upon the radio business. Radio stations, electronic stores, and electricity companies all needed the radio to survive, and relied upon the constant growth of the radio market to expand and grow themselves. By 1930, 40% of American families had radios28. In 1926 major broadcasting companies started appearing, such as the National Broadcasting Company. The advertising industry was also becoming heavily reliant upon the radio both as a product to be advertised, and as a method of advertising. Several factors lead to the concentration of wealth and prosperity into the automotive and radio industries. First, during World War I both the automobile and the radio were significantly improved upon. Both had existed before, but radio had been mostly experimental. Due to the demands of the war, by 1920 automobiles, radios, and the parts necessary to build these things were being produced in large quantities; the work force in these industries had been formed and had become experienced. Manufacturing plants were already in place. The infrastructure existed for the automotive and radio industries to take off. Second, due to federal government's easing of credit, money was available to invest in these industries. Thanks to pressure from President Coolidge and the business world, the Federal Reserve Board kept the rediscount rate low. The federal government favored the new industries as opposed to agriculture. During World War I the federal government had subsidized farms, and payed absurdly high prices for wheat and other grains. The federal government had encouraged farmers to buy more land, to modernize their methods with the latest in farm technology, and to produce more food. This made sense during that war when war-ravaged Europe had to be fed too. However as soon as the war ended, the U.S. abruptly stopped its policies to help farmers. During the war the United States government had paid an unheard of $2 a bushel for wheat, but by 1920 wheat prices had fallen to as low as 67 cents a bushel29. Farmers fell into debt; farm prices and food prices tumbled. Although modest attempts to help farmers were made in 1923 with the Agricultural Credits Act, farmers were generally left out in the cold by the government. The problem with such heavy concentrations of wealth and such massive dependence upon essentially two industries is similar to the problem with few people having too much wealth. The economy is reliant upon those industries to expand and grow and invest in order to prosper. If those two industries, the automotive and radio industries, were to slow down or stop, so would the entire economy. While the economy did prosper greatly in the 1920's, because this prosperity wasn't balanced between different industries, when those industries that had all the wealth concentrated in them slowed down, the whole economy did. The fundamental problem with the automobile and radio industries was that they could not expand ad infinitum for the simple reason that people could and would buy only so many cars and radios. When the automotive and radio industries went down all their dependents, essentially all of American industry, fell. Because it had been ignored, agriculture, which was still a fairly large segment of the economy, was already in ruin when American industry fell. A last major instability of the American economy had to do with large-scale international wealth distribution problems. While America was prospering in the 1920's, European nations were struggling to rebuild themselves after the damage of war. During World War I the U.S. government lent its European allies $7 billion, and then another $3.3 billion by 192030. By the Dawes Plan of 1924 the U.S. started lending to Axis Germany. American foreign lending continued in the 1920's climbing to $900 million in 1924, and $1.25 billion in 1927 and 192831. Of these funds, more than 90% were used by the European allies to purchase U.S. goods32. The nations the U.S. had lent money to (Britain, Italy, France, Belgium, Russia, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Poland, and others) were in no position to pay off the debts. Their gold had flowed into the U.S. during and immediately after the war in great quantity; they couldn't send more gold without completely ruining their currencies. Historian John D. Hicks describes the Allied attitude towards U.S. loan repayment: In their view the war was fought for a common objective, and the victory was as essential for the safety of the United States as for their own. The United States had entered the struggle late, and had poured forth no such contribution in lives and losses as the Allies had made. It had paid in dollars, not in death and destruction, and now it wanted its dollars back.33 There were several causes to this awkward distribution of wealth between U.S. and its European counterparts. Most obvious is that fact that World War I had devastated European business. Factories, homes, and farms had been destroyed in the war. It would take time and money to recuperate. Equally important to causing the disparate distribution of wealth was tariff policy of the United States. The United States had traditionally placed tariffs on imports from foreign countries in order to protect American business. However these tariffs reached an all-time high in the 1920's and early 1930's. Starting with the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922 and ending with the Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930, the United States increased many tariffs by 100% or more34. The effect of these tariffs was that Europeans were unable to sell their own goods in the United States in reasonable quantities. In the 1920's the United States was trying "to be the world's banker, food producer, and manufacturer, but to buy as little as possible from the world in return."35 This attempt to have a constantly favorable trade balance could not succeed for long. The United States maintained high trade barriers so as to protect American business, but if the United States would not buy from our European counterparts, then there was no way for them to buy from the Americans, or even to pay interest on U.S. loans. The weakness of the international economy certainly contributed to the Great Depression. Europe was reliant upon U.S. loans to buy U.S. goods, and the U.S. needed Europe to buy these goods to prosper. By 1929 10% of American gross national product went into exports36. When the foreign countries became no longer able to buy U.S. goods, U.S. exports fell 30% immediately. That $1.5 billion of foreign sales lost between 1929 to 1933 was fully one eighth of all lost American sales in the early years of the depression37. Mass speculation went on throughout the late 1920's. In 1929 alone, a record volume of 1,124,800,410 shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange38. From early 1928 to September 1929 the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose from 191 to 38139. This sort of profit was irresistible to investors. Company earnings became of little interest; as long as stock prices continued to rise huge profits could be made. One such example is RCA corporation, whose stock price leapt from 85 to 420 during 1928, even though it had not yet paid a single dividend40. Even these returns of over 100% were no measure of the possibility for investors of the time. Through the miracle of buying stocks on margin, one could buy stocks without the money to purchase them. Buying stocks on margin functioned much the same way as buying a car on credit. Using the example of RCA, a Mr. John Doe could buy 1 share of the company by putting up $10 of his own, and borrowing $75 from his broker. If he sold the stock at $420 a year later he would have turned his original investment of just $10 into $341.25 ($420 minus the $75 and 5% interest owed to the broker). That makes a return of over 3400%! Investors' craze over the proposition of profits like this drove the market to absurdly high levels. By mid 1929 the total of outstanding brokers' loans was over $7 billion41; in the next three months that number would reach $8.5 billion42. Interest rates for brokers loans were reaching the sky, going as high as 20% in March 192943. The speculative boom in the stock market was based upon confidence. In the same way, the huge market crashes of 1929 were based on fear. Prices had been drifting downward since September 3, but generally people where optimistic. Speculators continued to flock to the market. Then, on Monday October 21 prices started to fall quickly. The volume was so great that the ticker fell behind44. Investors became fearful. Knowing that prices were falling, but not by how much, they started selling quickly. This caused the collapse to happen faster. Prices stabilized a little on Tuesday and Wednesday, but then on Black Thursday, October 24, everything fell apart again. By this time most major investors had lost confidence in the market. Once enough investors had decided the boom was over, it was over. Partial recovery was achieved on Friday and Saturday when a group of leading bankers stepped in to try to stop the crash. But then on Monday the 28th prices started dropping again. By the end of the day the market had fallen 13%45. The next day, Black Tuesday an unprecedented 16.4 million shares changed hands46. Stocks fell so much, that at many times during the day no buyers were available at any price47. This speculation and the resulting stock market crashes acted as a trigger to the already unstable U.S. economy. Due to the maldistribution of wealth, the economy of the 1920's was one very much dependent upon confidence. The market crashes undermined this confidence. The rich stopped spending on luxury items, and slowed investments. The middle-class and poor stopped buying things with installment credit for fear of loosing their jobs, and not being able to pay the interest. As a result industrial production fell by more than 9% between the market crashes in October and December 192948. As a result jobs were lost, and soon people starting defaulting on their interest payment. Radios and cars bought with installment credit had to be returned. All of the sudden warehouses were piling up with inventory. The thriving industries that had been connected with the automobile and radio industries started falling apart. Without a car people did not need fuel or tires; without a radio people had less need for electricity. On the international scene, the rich had practically stopped lending money to foreign countries. With such tremendous profits to be made in the stock market nobody wanted to make low interest loans. To protect the nation's businesses the U.S. imposed higher trade barriers (Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930). Foreigners stopped buying American products. More jobs were lost, more stores were closed, more banks went under, and more factories closed. Unemployment grew to five million in 1930, and up to thirteen million in 193249. The country spiraled quickly into catastrophe. The Great Depression had begun.

if your asking what causes depression then this is what causes it: Depression can start when something bad happens to you. It can also happen when you feel kind of lonely. I hope that helped. If this wasn't the right answer, then sorry. I just know what causes depression.

The Great Depression of the 1930s was the economic event of the 20th century. The history of the depression is fascinating because it is a reference point for economic misery and fear. When people make financial planning decisions and politicians set policy the depression experience is, or maybe should be, in the back of everyone's mind as a worst case scenario. The depression is also interesting because, in hindsight, the downturn could have been much shallower had policy makers not made certain mistakes. Some of these mistakes have been very well researched by economists over the years and are highlighted here. There are also lessons to be had from the depression on human behavior and society in general. Lessons such as how blind and greedy we become when swept away by delusions of grandeur, only to flagellate ourselves when our dreams don't work out. And how our initial reaction to fear is to create barriers between others and ourselves resulting in added misery for everyone. If this was an article about how we recovered from the Great Depression there would also be inspiring stories of leadership and daring generosity among all kinds of people. How facing extreme difficulties put people in touch with a wealth that was beyond their empty bank accounts. In this article though we'll focus on the economics of the downside. Back to Gold Ocean! Back to the top What Happened? The Great Depression began in 1929 when the entire world suffered an enormous drop in output and an unprecedented rise in unemployment. World economic output continued to decline until 1932 when it clinked bottom at 50% of its 1929 level. Unemployment soared, in the United States it peaked at 24.9% in 1933. It remained above 20% for two more years, reluctantly declining to 14.3% by 1937. It then leapt back to 19% before its long-term decline. Since most households had only one income earner the equivalent modern unemployment rates would likely be much higher. Real economic output (real GDP) fell by 29% from 1929 to 1933 and the US stock market lost 89.5% of its value. Another unusual aspect of the Great Depression was deflation. Prices fell 25%, 30%, 30%, and 40% in the UK, Germany, the US, and France respectively from 1929 to 1933. These were the four largest economies in the world at that time. To put the severity of the depression in modern perspective, consider the following. Real US GDP went down 4.4% in the five years that it declined since 1959, all added together! Unemployment has never exceeded 9.7% and we have not had one year of deflation. Maybe you're thinking, "what's wrong with a little price deflation?" Depending on how much and how unexpected, deflation can be a devastating economic event. Imagine wages falling by 30% and the value of debts simultaneously increasing by that much. In the great depression it would have been nice if the suffering had been so evenly distributed. Instead the deflation caused bankruptcies, which in turn led to, more bankruptcies! Millions of people and companies were wiped out completely. The lack of adequate social programs left people of all social strata depending on relatives and friends for charity. Spending became paralyzed with fear as the downturn was so unexpected, so severe, and the bad news just kept coming for years. Many did not realize how severe the downturn was until 1932 or 1933 when the economy had technically hit bottom and even begun to chug forward. People's resources were depleted by then and so were many of their friends'. So the human misery caused by the Depression really started in the mid-1930s. The political backlash to the miserable economic situation is often blamed for toppling democracies, bringing fascist governments to power in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and ultimately provoking the Second World War. "Hitler's rise to power can be directly linked to the profound economic crisis in Germany at that time". The German economic crisis was compounded by the huge war reparations imposed upon the Germans following World War I (an interesting comment on the efficacy of economic sanctions!). Back to Gold Ocean! Back to the top What Caused the Great Depression? There are several explanations for what happened but the most obvious conclusion is that it was the confluence of several shortsighted and commiserating factors. Three main themes emerge: historical factors, central bank policies, and political decision making. For the purposes of this discussion the focus will be on the United States. The US in the 1920's: Buying into the Boom The 1929 stock market crash marked the beginning of the Depression. Prior to the crash the stock market had been an important source of funding for industry; thus the crash itself was a contributing factor to the downturn as well as a harbinger of things to come. Since stock prices are based on estimates of future earnings potential, the stock market performance of the 1920's tells a story of runaway optimism for the future. When it peaked a few weeks before the crash, The Dow Jones had risen 597% over the previous 8 years. It was soon to become a symbol of runaway pessimism. The freeing of capital from government use to commercial use following World War I caused commodity prices to inflate. In 1920, Ben Strong of the US Federal Reserve Bank of New York raised interest rates sharply to prevent inflation. This caused a recession and the stock market to fall. Once hard assets like commodities and real estate were no longer rising in price, money began to pour into stocks and bonds. The Dow started climbing from its low at 63.90 in 1921 and rose 150% over the four years to 1925. According to Ron Chernow, in "The House of Morgan", It was in 1925 that Ben Strong made a secret commitment to Montague Norman, Governor of the Bank of England, to help England reinstate the Gold Standard. This action would later be shown to have undermined the British economy but the Pound had been the main medium of international exchange at that time and it was felt to be in everyone's interest to have it be exchangeable for gold. With moral support from the US Treasury, Strong chose to help strengthen the value of the Pound by depressing US interest rates. This depressed the value of the US Dollar and caused the already robust economy to boom. It was suddenly cheaper to borrow money to invest in the stock market (called margin investing). Since the Dow had risen steadily since 1921, "small investors leapt giddily into the stock market in large numbers". The margin requirement at that time was only 10%, meaning you could buy $10,000 worth of stock with only $1,000 down, borrowing the rest. With artificially low interest rates and a booming economy people and companies were more apt than ever to invest in grandiose business expansions and over-priced stocks. Mergers and acquisitions soared. In 1927, Britain ran into trouble with its gold standard again and Ben Strong lowered US interest rates in sympathy for a second time. This ignited the boom into the speculative frenzy that brought the market to its peak on September 3, 1929. It was like pouring gasoline onto a fire - the flames rose up, no lasting fuel was added, but the economy sure looked great. Ben Strong died in October 1928. George Harrison, his successor immediately lobbied for higher interest rates to cool the speculative fervor. Rates were finally raised 1% in August of 1929, but by then it was way too late. The Dow peaked at 381.17. The market and the economy had buoyed itself from one source of hope to the next for a whole decade. First it was the end of war-related inflation and booming exports for war reparations, next artificially low interest rates in 1925 and 1927 and booming exports due to a reduced value of the Dollar vs. the Pound. There were major tax reductions instituted by the Republicans under Hoover and finally in June of 1929 an international accord was struck with the Germans (albeit short-lived) over the financing of war reparations, a major issue of the decade. By Monday, October 28, 1929 the Dow had fallen 20% to 300. It fell 40 more points that day and another 30 on Tuesday (Tragic Tuesday) to reach a temporary bottom at 230.07. It was down 40% from the peak 56 days earlier. George Harrison bravely stepped in to provide tremendous amounts of credit to the banking system. This action prevented immediate bank failures and bankruptcies and a total collapse. The market recovered a good bit of ground but began to fall again before year-end. By mid-1930 this liberal credit policy was to be reversed affecting the money supply crisis discussed below. In early 1930, there were 60 bank failures per month in the US but when the Fed tightened its purse strings, things got much worse. 254 banks failed in November and 344 in December of 1930. Among these was the Bank of the United States, with 450,000 depositors it was the fourth largest bank in New York. Although it was a private bank, "The biggest bank failure in American history, the Bank of the United States bankruptcy fed a psychology of fear that gripped depositors across the country." In spite of further tax cuts, public works programs and optimistic speeches, spending and thus economic activity just kept going down. The stock market would make temporary recoveries, sucking buyers in, only to free fall again. The Dow finally hit bottom at the level of 41.22 on July 8, 1932, 10.5% of its peak three years prior. Interestingly, various bankers, government officials, and academics chose this three-year period to expound righteous advocacy of personal, corporate, and governmental frugality and restraint. "Leadership" that was so lacking when it could have helped in the frenetic 1920s. John Maynard Keynes, the famous British economist whose economic stabilization theories would greatly influence the recovery in years to come, however, warned such austerity would only deepen the depression. As we will see, truly it did. Back to Gold Ocean! Back to the top Central Banking Delusion: A Sharp Reduction in the Money Supply Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued in their book "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960," that the highly conservative monetary policy followed by the Fed beginning in 1930, completely failed to counteract the tidal wave of bank failures in the early 30's. Simply put, when a bank fails a large amount of money disappears from the economy, which has a depressing effect on prices and a stagnating effect on business activity. Depositors were not insured at that point, many losing all their savings. Business customers also lost their money and could not finance their activities; thus everyone linked to the bank or its customers was economically paralyzed in one way or another, including other banks! It is generally agreed today that the "money supply", which refers to the total amount of money circulating in the economy, should grow at the same rate that the economy grows. Any faster is inflationary and any slower is deflationary. When a bank fails the Fed has the option to either bailout that bank by lending it money or to lend more money to other banks to fill in the shrinkage in the money supply. Otherwise the amount of money in circulation shrinks and the economy limps along like a person parched for water. The Fed had allowed the money supply to grow at the annual rate of 2.7% from 1921 through 1929, slightly slower than the economy grew over that period, thus the economically booming 1920's was a period of price stability and even modest deflation. Between 1930 and 1933 the Fed refused to replenish the banking system sufficiently, even though the money supply was shrinking due to hoards of bankruptcies and bank failures. "Many at the Fed saw the austerity as a bitter but necessary medicine". The money supply fell 27% from 1929 to 1933 and real economic output fell 29% accordingly. Thus early bank failures led to further bank failures and bankruptcies and so on. Had the Fed been more accommodating, much of the domino effect would not have occurred. Back to Gold Ocean! Back to the top Political Faux pas There were two important political contributions to the severity and length of the great depression. The first was the cataclysmic collapse of world trade. The Demise of Trade The leading industrialized nations responded to the crisis by imposing trade barriers on imports with the hopes of increasing demand for domestically produced goods and to raise revenue from tariffs. "Concerns about low agricultural prices, an influx of imports, rising unemployment, and declining tax revenue generated public sentiment for trade restraints." The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of June 17, 1930 responded by raising tariffs by up to 50% on a wide range of goods. Unfortunately, the resulting fall in imports created unemployment abroad that quickly invoked protectionism in response, creating unemployment back in the US! Many fruitful trading relationships fell apart and the depressed domestic economies could not make up for them. In "The World in Depression 1929-1939" Charles Kinderberger shows that by March 1933 international trade plummeted to 33% of its 1929 level. Since there were even more communications, logistic, and financial barriers to be overcome back then than there are today, it is likely that the goods traded internationally were of great economic value and advantage to the economies that were receiving them. The loss of such trade was devastating and had ripple effects not unlike bank failures. Ironically, even though tariff rates rose by up to 50%, imports declined so sharply that tariff revenues fell 46% from $602 million in 1929 to $328 million in 1932. This not to mention the loss of tax revenue from the domestic unemployment the tariffs caused indirectly. Taxing Timing Under the political thinking of the day (and since nothing else was working) the federal government decided it was morally prudent to pursue a balanced budget. As tax revenue was plummeting along with economic activity in the period from 1929 to 1932 it was only natural to raise taxes to cover the mushrooming deficit. In 1932, Republican president, Herbert Hoover, with the support of the newly elected Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, passed the largest peacetime tax increase in the history of the United States. Marginal income tax rates were raised from 1.5% to 4% at the low end and from 25% to 63% at the top of the scale. A huge tax increase by any measure. Some people say the timing for this couldn't have been worse because tax increases are generally associated with decreases in aggregate demand for goods and services and the incentive to earn. But the low tax rates prior to 1932 had not prevented the drop in demand to date. At that point the situation was becoming so severe that anybody that still had a job had every incentive to earn, if only to keep it. The main obstacle to demand then was probably fear of spending! If you earned money, you saved as much as you possibly could and with bank failures everywhere, you probably hid your savings under the mattress. So maybe it was just as well to pay more out in taxes because then the government could spend it for you and stimulate the economy that way. But the tax increase did take money out of people's hands that could have been spent more "efficiently" if not equitably, so it is considered to be a factor, which prolonged the downturn. Under the circumstances the government should have simply borrowed and engaged in generous deficit spending. Back to Gold Ocean! Back to the top Conclusion So the three main factors contributing to the severity of the Great Depression were: The over-stimulated economic euphoria of the 1920s. The draconian monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve Bank from 1930-1933. The sudden rise of global protectionism leading to the collapse of world trade. The dramatic rise of income taxes in 1932 may have also prolonged the downturn. There were many other factors which made the human experience much worse than it had to be such as the lack of adequate social safety nets like Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, Medicare, and Welfare programs. These programs were mostly implemented in response to the Great Depression and have well served the function of automatic economic stabilizers since. It is morbidly amusing to witness policy debate over such programs by politicians these days who have forgotten the depression. When times are good, those in need are seen as anomalous social groups and social programs become ill funded and pejorative. Perhaps it takes a Great Depression once in a while to remind us that we are all cut from the same cloth. It is just a matter of time. I hope this helps! I finally got the right answer!