Nope. In fact, the opposite is true. There is a generally recognized right to be free of interference for you private thoughts and ideas. It would violate international custom (international law is a vague term) to imprison someone for not revealing knowledge (with minor exception when a duty is placed upon that person).

A right is historically a freedom for you. Check out the Bill of Rights. YOU are FREE to ________. Recently, people have tried to include as a RIGHT the guarantee that someone else will do something FOR you. So ..... a RIGHT to health care, for examples, means that you have a RIGHT to expect others to provide you with goods and services without any expectation of compensation from you. You see the problem. What about the rights of those people providing the goods and services? When a politician says you should have a RIGHT to _______ and it not something that YOU do but something that someone else is expected to do for you, do not vote for them. When a politician says ___________ is a priority and we need to create a system to pay for ____________ or providing __________ at taxpayer expense, listen very carefully.

1) ""Do you have the right to destroy that which is yours?" This paper addresses that fundamental question. In contested cases, courts are becoming increasingly hostile to owners' efforts to destroy their own valuable property. This sentiment has been echoed in the legal academy, with recent scholarship calling for further restrictions on an owner's right to destroy cultural and other property. Yet this property right has received little systematic attention. The paper therefore examines owners' rights to destroy various forms of property, including buildings, jewelry, transplantable organs, frozen human embryos, patents, personal papers, and works of art. A systematic treatment of the subject helps support a qualified defense of the right to destroy one's own property. For example, an examination of American laws and customs regarding the disposition of cadaveric organs helps one understand and weigh the expressive interests that prompt people to try to destroy jewelry via will. Similarly, an examination of patent suppression case law points toward a form of ex ante analysis that has been de-emphasized in opinions involving the destruction of buildings and other structures. An analysis of cases involving the destruction of frozen human embryos may shed light on creators' rights to burn unpublished manuscripts or works of art. And collectivist theories of free speech may help explain why the Visual Artists Rights Act sensibly prohibits the destruction of paintings by living artists, but not Old Masters. In advocating a more unified treatment of destruction rights, the paper argues that greater deference to owners' destructive wishes often serves important welfare and expressive interests. The paper also critiques existing case laws that call for particular hostility toward will provisions that direct the destruction of a testator's valuable property. Courts and commentators have not given particularly persuasive justifications for restricting testamentary destruction, and the paper proposes a safe-harbor provision whereby sincere testators who jump through certain hoops during their lifetimes can have their destructive wishes enforced." Source and further information: http://culturalpolicy.uchicago.edu/wkshp2004.html 2) "Part I of the Article sets forth the historical treatment of the right to destroy and explores some conceptual difficulties inherent in any discussion of property destruction. Under Roman law, the right to destroy or abuse--the jus abutendi--served the important function of demarcating the boundaries of an owner's rights in property. Under this conception, destruction functioned as the most extreme recognized property right, so the owner who could destroy his property necessarily had the right to use it in less extreme fashions. Blackstone's characterization of the English common law echoed similar themes, limiting the owner's right to destroy only in those cases where destruction occurred in a manner that threatened the property rights of third parties. In this sense, we shall see that Blackstone rejected John Locke's arguably narrower notion of ownership. In the twentieth century, the right to destroy fell out of favor, and the most recent literature has argued that such a right, if it exists at all, should be substantially circumscribed on public policy grounds. Part I then offers a definition of property destruction that steers the reader toward the interesting, contested cases of destruction that affect future generations. Part II examines the major argument courts have put forth to justify limitations on the right to destroy one's own property--the fear that valuable resources will be wasted. Most of the case law that limits the right to destroy does so on this basis. While waste prevention is a valid basis for restricting one's right to destroy, an analysis of the case law suggests that courts often fail to appreciate the ways in which protecting the right to destroy can enhance social welfare by protecting privacy, creating open spaces, encouraging innovation and creation, or promoting candor and risk taking. A critical reading of the cases suggests the various antiwaste rules that courts have promulgated might well have resulted in diminished social welfare by discouraging the creation of the valuable property courts are so keen on protecting. Part II also considers contexts in which the law tolerates substantial waste, focusing on organ transplantation policy and patent suppression. These examples can help develop the broader case for destruction generally. Indeed, society's unfortunate willingness to tolerate substantial organ destruction renders the law's hostility to less harmful destruction somewhat perplexing. Part III explores the intangible benefits associated with property destruction. When rational people destroy valuable property, they often do so because of deeply held expressive interests. History provides many examples in which valuable pieces of property have been destroyed by owners who used destruction to gain attention for a cause or message. The Article argues that under certain circumstances, these expressive interests ought to trump the social waste that results from the destruction of valuable property. It then suggests that the antidestruction provisions of the United States's Visual Artists Rights Act provide a useful model for reconciling society's interest in preserving irreplaceable works of art with the expressive interests of property owners and the general public. Finally, Part III concludes by exploring whether those who create property, particularly intellectual property, ought to have expanded destruction rights." Source and further information: http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst;jsessionid=J7zWNnYJwvw5bpz6LJcQ0rK2nl1YxHlGnDP11gn20rVCLvMTC0cT!1880493098?docId=5008733343 3) However, it would be interesting to consider here two points: - the right to health - the Hippocratic Oath (if the person is a physician) "The United Nations expanded upon the "Right to Health" in Article 12 of the International Covenant in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. Not only did this document guarantee the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health", but it also specifically called for the "provision for the reductions of . . . infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child; the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational, and other diseases; and the creation of conditions which could assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness."" Source and further information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_to_health Further information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippocratic_Oath